I enjoyed reading your article. However, I wondered if a couple of your examples might have undercut your message?
You mentioned Kitty Genovese, for instance, and Bystander Effect. However, last I had heard, the KG story had largely been debunked. The woman did die, of course, but bystander effect had nothing to do with it (the 38 witnesses were largely made up). this was covered in American Psychologist I think back in 2007. That doesn't mean bystander effect is untrue of course, but does complicate that narrative, and I do sometimes think social psychologists are guilty of overstating it when people's reactions to crises may vary quite a bit.
Milgram too has a big asterisk now. Perry and colleagues (2019) have suggested Milgram appears to have failed to disclose that many/most of his participants actually recognized the ruse of his experiment and those who did were most likely to go all the way. I suppose you could say his preexisting beliefs there may have influenced some dodgy reporting decisions. Maybe not the best case for activism-inspired research?
As always, Chris, a reasonable take. I wasn't actually thinking so much about the ultimate truth value as the process. I don't think most people would question the process of deriving hypotheses from current events or football games, and to me those are parallel to the process activists use in deriving hypotheses. The ultimate truth value of any idea will be variable across the ideas, and so I would assume that some of them will prove to be true, some false, and a lot of them in the middle range (some parts true, some parts false, always qualified). Personally, I strongly suspect the ultimate truth value of psychological ideas derived from progressivism will be appreciably lower than those derived from a conservative take on psychology. But whether or not that's true, I think both groups have the right to draw hypotheses from their pre-scientific assumptions. And then let's put all of them to a rigorous test in the scientific arena.
I don't know about the bystander effect itself, but I was aware that people had questioned the original story. But I'm not sure (maybe?) that is relevant to the link I was arguing for -- the link between researcher perception/experiences/beliefs and hypothesis generation. In fact, the falseness of the original story might strengthen my analogy in many regards. I think most progressive assumptions are false personally (as I'm sure you are aware, I really dislike progressive politics), and yet even if that is the case, I think it is possible to derive useful study ideas from those assumptions -- and I don't think the free market of science should stop that process (because almost certainly, my beliefs about those assumptions are also biased...and sometimes false assumptions can lead to novel and true ideas).
Milgram's study has been replicated all over the world for decades, with similar results (see, e.g., Blass, 2012). It's been replicated in the US and Poland in the last 20 years, too. Haven't read the Perry article -- maybe they deal with that, maybe it is inherent in the paradigm -- but on the surface, that seems a tall order to overcome. However, I need to read the article in question before forming a clear judgment, so I'm grateful you put that article on my radar. (I literally just taught on Milgram yesterday in my cross-cultural psychology class, and I do try to be accurate).
Well my thought is if your point was that activism could product interesting hypotheses (a point I don't dispute), those case examples might also suggest how those same individuals might simultaneously reject data even from their own studies because they become wedded to their own hypothesis generation. Due to that activism (progressive or conservative), the hypotheses have something other than value neutral propositions to be tested objectively with data, but rather are babies to be protected, with the data morphed and corrupted to fit that preexisting narrative. In that sense I think the context of the story always does kind of matter.
That's particularly true for stories such as KG with a long, well-known history of distortion and misperception. I'd argue that, if raised, it's always helpful just to add the "...although it turned out the parable of the 38 witnesses was false."
As for Milgram I don't think that decades of replications means much in light of the replication crisis as the same could have been said about, say, social priming or media violence, both now well understood as having been central to the replication crisis. Often the claim of "this has been replicated many times" proves on closer look (as with media violence) to be more complicated, with studies often messy, inconsistent and poor in quality. So that Milgram has been replicated many times is less interesting to me than if it's been replicated even a few times under the most rigorous circumstances, including preregistration, maybe adversarial collaboration and...if so...what are the effect sizes? Are we talking "statistical significance" but effect sizes near zero or is there something robust. That actually may all be true, and I'd love to hear if so.
BIRG is that basking in related glory. Haven't followed that one...
Another excellent post. FWIW, I pointed out to Nate, right after The Singeing, that our entire panel was activist in the sense that we were trying to change how things were being done at SPSP -- and all of us (to varying degrees) brought scientific evidence to bear on why that was necessary and justified. He did not (I think because he could not) deny that.
(For anyone seeing this comment who does not know what The Singeing refers to, go here:
I'd also argue that: 1. actively trying to change academic societies to which we belong is a completely reasonable thing to do; 2. This is very different from trying to change society in some way or another; 3. Doing honest, rigorous research as unpolluted by political agendas as possible and then trying to make that available to policy-makers seems reasonable to me (something your post seems to support, but I am not sure I'd call that "not activism"); 4. Problems come in when researchers publish bad scholarship that promote false or unjustified claims on political and politicized topics (plausibly construed as a form of propaganda masquerading as social science), which is a problem in and of itself; and then 5. argue or even try to use it to change society in some ways. A prime example of this is how, within a few years of publishing their early work on "implicit bias," Greenwald and Banaji took to law journals to get policy makers and judges to incorporate it into legal practices -- and some courts took them up on this, even providing instructions to jurors about their "implicit biases." The nasty nature of this is now revealed in all its ingloriousness, inasmuch as *almost every one of the major claims about "implicit bias" made from 2000-2012* has had to be seriously walked back. Unconscious? No. Does 0 on the IAT=egalitarianism? No. Given that, the wild statements about "80% of Americans having unconscious racism" were never justified (because they were based on scores above 0 on the IAT and scores well above generally corresponded to anti-White behavior and judgments. I could go on...
I completely agree, Lee. I also appreciate you raising the fourth point, which in many ways is the real question we are asking when we ask "should scientists be activists?" That question is essentially "should scientists take their scientific findings and actively promote them in public policy?" Curiously, I didn't address that in my article at all (although I was aware of the gap). And I think that was Nate's original point too -- and both you and he are of course right about that issue writ large. I think the issue is complicated (I mean, I do think it's fine for us to make policy recommendations, etc.), but even though I'm more bullish on IAT work than you are, we surely should be more restrained than THAT.
“My pre-scientific beliefs about God are far, far more important to me – and far larger and expansive – than any specific scientific study.”...
“Most scientists value non-scientific things – their children, their family, their faith, their friends, their politics – more than they value the outcome of a scientific study.”
That is a very poor parallel.
Nothing, I mean not any scientific study, should ever come between us and our children and family. We love our children unconditionally; we don’t abandon them based on scientific evidence. They are real human beings, not imaginary beings or theological constructs. They do not represent metaphysical commitments. Imaginary characters can be revised, reinterpreted, or abandoned.
Christianity (like any religion) often contains claims that conflict with scientific methods. When someone publicly declares “Jesus above all” (as you do in your profile on X), that means something very different for a scientist than “My children above all.”
Of course, many scientists successfully separate personal beliefs from their work, but strong identity‑level commitments are well‑known to shape reasoning: motivated reasoning, confirmation bias, identity‑protective cognition, belief perseverance, directional reasoning… The stronger the identity bond, the harder it is to update beliefs.
So yes, if a scientist proclaims “Jesus above all,” it is reasonable to treat that as a potential epistemic red flag. Just as we should be cautious if a scientist says “Marx above all,” “Nation above all,” “Equity above all,” or “Islam above all,” the issue isn’t the content, it’s the strength of allegiance + identity fusion + moral centrality.
Publicly placing any non‑scientific authority “above all” raises legitimate questions about how scientific evidence is prioritized. You can rationalize your stance, but psychological research consistently shows that we should approach with caution any scientist who prioritizes religion or other strong ideological commitments over scientific evidence.
Absolutely, believing in something as ultimately important makes you biased. And absolutely, Christians have done biased science because of that belief.
And you are right, and it is very fair of you, to note that this isn't just Christianity -- it is everything. Believing in Marx makes you biased. Believing in Islam makes you biased. Believing in Equity makes you biased.
Also, believing in scientific atheism makes you biased. You really can't escape bias. You can only do your best to overcome it.
But the real question that's relevant here isn't about a meta-system's propensity to bias. All are essentially equal on that score. It is about something my article didn't address: The meta-system's logical compatibility with the scientific method. On that, Christianity scores extremely highly (progressivism, probably not so much).
I don't think it is (entirely) an accident that it was Christians who largely created modern science. Francis Bacon was an Anglican. No fewer than 10 major scientific disciplines were founded by Christians. Christianity largely created the modern university system. We have spread education everywhere we went. Yes, there has been opposition to scientific theories and science as well in Christianity; often severe opposition. I'm not denying that. That would be true anywhere at all times and all places when new ideas come into play. But overall, out of that morass emerged modern science, which largely grew in civilizations and contexts dominated by Christians.
Atheists have disproportionately (disproportionate to the population) won Nobel Prizes and have also done a huge amount of great scientific work. I have deep respect for that work. So I'm not trying to suggest that this has ever been a Christians-only enterprise. Of course that isn't true. If anything, proportionally, atheists have shown more propensity to do great science. But it is undeniable that Christians have at a minimum played a huge role in creating modern science. And this isn't an accident -- it is because Christianity provides a great epistemology for empiricism.
So when you argue that my belief in "Jesus above all" (and to be clear -- that is unapologetically my belief) inhibits me from doing great science, I mostly point to the long history of science that says otherwise.
However, you raise some substantive points here that are certainly worth fleshing out more -- I may perhaps do so in another post. And I appreciate the spirit of fairness with which your intellectual points are raised!
Thanks for your reply, Luke. Here is further clarification.
Of course, we all have biases, and we all struggle with them, trying to be the best scientists we can be. But the problem becomes more serious when we study topics that are very close to our core identity. I have written about this previously in relation to my own field. For example, if someone openly states “I hate cars, and that motivated my entire scientific career in transport research,” then I cannot help but wonder what comes first for them—the pursuit of truth or their personal animosity (below is the quote from my article).
In your case, you did not say you “hate” anything, but you did express “Jesus above all.” Then you published a piece on Islamophobia, criticizing previous research and calling out progressive scholars. Honestly, this makes me uneasy. Especially because you did not even discuss that even the low prevalence estimates (up to 3% phobic and 7% fearful) you found in your work may carry meaningful social consequences, given the types of involuntary behavioral reactions that individuals with clinically significant fear may exhibit when encountering the object of their phobia.
As I mentioned earlier, I submitted my commentary on your article to the journal, but it was rejected by the editor using language I found derogatory.
Among other thing the editor resubmitted my manuscript without my consent. In my email after the editor requested revision, I explicitly indicated that I intended to submit a revised version only after receiving responses to my questions. This indicates that I had not authorized resubmission. Author approval is a fundamental requirement for submission actions, and this step was taken without such approval. In the absence of author approval, the manuscript should have been withdrawn rather than resubmitted and desk rejected.
So yes, I remain skeptical about what kind of scientific environment this represents—what is allowed, and what is not allowed, to be published in that journal. It feels as though long‑neglected conservative scholars (such as you?) may have finally found an outlet that gives them an unusually easy ride, while any criticism is dismissed with dubious argumentation and questionable editorial practices.
“A well-known and respected active travel researcher said in a recent inter view “I have been a hater of cars from my entire life. And that was what I was actually motivated my entire academic career” (Bernstein, & Reid, 2021, 2:49). Although the negative impact of cars on the environment and health is well researched and documented, it can hardly be put in the same category as cancer for example. There is a broad scientific consensus that no benefits can be associated with cancer, thus, hating cancer seems appropriate, although such researchers should be conscious about their strong motivation and the negative effects it can have on their work (e.g., observer bias). The same can hardly be said about cars as a machine. Openly stating that hate toward cars preceded and motivated an entire academic career is a clear sign of a biased approach to the topic of one’s research. A legitimate question arises here: if you hate the topic of your research, be it a car or perhaps a bicycle helmet, how will you as an editor or reviewer deal with a paper that says anything positive about cars or helmets?”
I enjoyed reading your article. However, I wondered if a couple of your examples might have undercut your message?
You mentioned Kitty Genovese, for instance, and Bystander Effect. However, last I had heard, the KG story had largely been debunked. The woman did die, of course, but bystander effect had nothing to do with it (the 38 witnesses were largely made up). this was covered in American Psychologist I think back in 2007. That doesn't mean bystander effect is untrue of course, but does complicate that narrative, and I do sometimes think social psychologists are guilty of overstating it when people's reactions to crises may vary quite a bit.
Milgram too has a big asterisk now. Perry and colleagues (2019) have suggested Milgram appears to have failed to disclose that many/most of his participants actually recognized the ruse of his experiment and those who did were most likely to go all the way. I suppose you could say his preexisting beliefs there may have influenced some dodgy reporting decisions. Maybe not the best case for activism-inspired research?
Cheers,
Chris
As always, Chris, a reasonable take. I wasn't actually thinking so much about the ultimate truth value as the process. I don't think most people would question the process of deriving hypotheses from current events or football games, and to me those are parallel to the process activists use in deriving hypotheses. The ultimate truth value of any idea will be variable across the ideas, and so I would assume that some of them will prove to be true, some false, and a lot of them in the middle range (some parts true, some parts false, always qualified). Personally, I strongly suspect the ultimate truth value of psychological ideas derived from progressivism will be appreciably lower than those derived from a conservative take on psychology. But whether or not that's true, I think both groups have the right to draw hypotheses from their pre-scientific assumptions. And then let's put all of them to a rigorous test in the scientific arena.
I don't know about the bystander effect itself, but I was aware that people had questioned the original story. But I'm not sure (maybe?) that is relevant to the link I was arguing for -- the link between researcher perception/experiences/beliefs and hypothesis generation. In fact, the falseness of the original story might strengthen my analogy in many regards. I think most progressive assumptions are false personally (as I'm sure you are aware, I really dislike progressive politics), and yet even if that is the case, I think it is possible to derive useful study ideas from those assumptions -- and I don't think the free market of science should stop that process (because almost certainly, my beliefs about those assumptions are also biased...and sometimes false assumptions can lead to novel and true ideas).
Milgram's study has been replicated all over the world for decades, with similar results (see, e.g., Blass, 2012). It's been replicated in the US and Poland in the last 20 years, too. Haven't read the Perry article -- maybe they deal with that, maybe it is inherent in the paradigm -- but on the surface, that seems a tall order to overcome. However, I need to read the article in question before forming a clear judgment, so I'm grateful you put that article on my radar. (I literally just taught on Milgram yesterday in my cross-cultural psychology class, and I do try to be accurate).
Surely no one questions BIRGing?
thanks for the reply.
Well my thought is if your point was that activism could product interesting hypotheses (a point I don't dispute), those case examples might also suggest how those same individuals might simultaneously reject data even from their own studies because they become wedded to their own hypothesis generation. Due to that activism (progressive or conservative), the hypotheses have something other than value neutral propositions to be tested objectively with data, but rather are babies to be protected, with the data morphed and corrupted to fit that preexisting narrative. In that sense I think the context of the story always does kind of matter.
That's particularly true for stories such as KG with a long, well-known history of distortion and misperception. I'd argue that, if raised, it's always helpful just to add the "...although it turned out the parable of the 38 witnesses was false."
As for Milgram I don't think that decades of replications means much in light of the replication crisis as the same could have been said about, say, social priming or media violence, both now well understood as having been central to the replication crisis. Often the claim of "this has been replicated many times" proves on closer look (as with media violence) to be more complicated, with studies often messy, inconsistent and poor in quality. So that Milgram has been replicated many times is less interesting to me than if it's been replicated even a few times under the most rigorous circumstances, including preregistration, maybe adversarial collaboration and...if so...what are the effect sizes? Are we talking "statistical significance" but effect sizes near zero or is there something robust. That actually may all be true, and I'd love to hear if so.
BIRG is that basking in related glory. Haven't followed that one...
Cheers,
Chris
Another excellent post. FWIW, I pointed out to Nate, right after The Singeing, that our entire panel was activist in the sense that we were trying to change how things were being done at SPSP -- and all of us (to varying degrees) brought scientific evidence to bear on why that was necessary and justified. He did not (I think because he could not) deny that.
(For anyone seeing this comment who does not know what The Singeing refers to, go here:
https://unsafescience.substack.com/p/the-singeing-of-the-society-for-personality
https://theapologeticprofessor.substack.com/p/the-scientific-method-is-not-racist).
I'd also argue that: 1. actively trying to change academic societies to which we belong is a completely reasonable thing to do; 2. This is very different from trying to change society in some way or another; 3. Doing honest, rigorous research as unpolluted by political agendas as possible and then trying to make that available to policy-makers seems reasonable to me (something your post seems to support, but I am not sure I'd call that "not activism"); 4. Problems come in when researchers publish bad scholarship that promote false or unjustified claims on political and politicized topics (plausibly construed as a form of propaganda masquerading as social science), which is a problem in and of itself; and then 5. argue or even try to use it to change society in some ways. A prime example of this is how, within a few years of publishing their early work on "implicit bias," Greenwald and Banaji took to law journals to get policy makers and judges to incorporate it into legal practices -- and some courts took them up on this, even providing instructions to jurors about their "implicit biases." The nasty nature of this is now revealed in all its ingloriousness, inasmuch as *almost every one of the major claims about "implicit bias" made from 2000-2012* has had to be seriously walked back. Unconscious? No. Does 0 on the IAT=egalitarianism? No. Given that, the wild statements about "80% of Americans having unconscious racism" were never justified (because they were based on scores above 0 on the IAT and scores well above generally corresponded to anti-White behavior and judgments. I could go on...
I completely agree, Lee. I also appreciate you raising the fourth point, which in many ways is the real question we are asking when we ask "should scientists be activists?" That question is essentially "should scientists take their scientific findings and actively promote them in public policy?" Curiously, I didn't address that in my article at all (although I was aware of the gap). And I think that was Nate's original point too -- and both you and he are of course right about that issue writ large. I think the issue is complicated (I mean, I do think it's fine for us to make policy recommendations, etc.), but even though I'm more bullish on IAT work than you are, we surely should be more restrained than THAT.
“My pre-scientific beliefs about God are far, far more important to me – and far larger and expansive – than any specific scientific study.”...
“Most scientists value non-scientific things – their children, their family, their faith, their friends, their politics – more than they value the outcome of a scientific study.”
That is a very poor parallel.
Nothing, I mean not any scientific study, should ever come between us and our children and family. We love our children unconditionally; we don’t abandon them based on scientific evidence. They are real human beings, not imaginary beings or theological constructs. They do not represent metaphysical commitments. Imaginary characters can be revised, reinterpreted, or abandoned.
Christianity (like any religion) often contains claims that conflict with scientific methods. When someone publicly declares “Jesus above all” (as you do in your profile on X), that means something very different for a scientist than “My children above all.”
Of course, many scientists successfully separate personal beliefs from their work, but strong identity‑level commitments are well‑known to shape reasoning: motivated reasoning, confirmation bias, identity‑protective cognition, belief perseverance, directional reasoning… The stronger the identity bond, the harder it is to update beliefs.
So yes, if a scientist proclaims “Jesus above all,” it is reasonable to treat that as a potential epistemic red flag. Just as we should be cautious if a scientist says “Marx above all,” “Nation above all,” “Equity above all,” or “Islam above all,” the issue isn’t the content, it’s the strength of allegiance + identity fusion + moral centrality.
Publicly placing any non‑scientific authority “above all” raises legitimate questions about how scientific evidence is prioritized. You can rationalize your stance, but psychological research consistently shows that we should approach with caution any scientist who prioritizes religion or other strong ideological commitments over scientific evidence.
Absolutely, believing in something as ultimately important makes you biased. And absolutely, Christians have done biased science because of that belief.
And you are right, and it is very fair of you, to note that this isn't just Christianity -- it is everything. Believing in Marx makes you biased. Believing in Islam makes you biased. Believing in Equity makes you biased.
Also, believing in scientific atheism makes you biased. You really can't escape bias. You can only do your best to overcome it.
But the real question that's relevant here isn't about a meta-system's propensity to bias. All are essentially equal on that score. It is about something my article didn't address: The meta-system's logical compatibility with the scientific method. On that, Christianity scores extremely highly (progressivism, probably not so much).
I don't think it is (entirely) an accident that it was Christians who largely created modern science. Francis Bacon was an Anglican. No fewer than 10 major scientific disciplines were founded by Christians. Christianity largely created the modern university system. We have spread education everywhere we went. Yes, there has been opposition to scientific theories and science as well in Christianity; often severe opposition. I'm not denying that. That would be true anywhere at all times and all places when new ideas come into play. But overall, out of that morass emerged modern science, which largely grew in civilizations and contexts dominated by Christians.
Atheists have disproportionately (disproportionate to the population) won Nobel Prizes and have also done a huge amount of great scientific work. I have deep respect for that work. So I'm not trying to suggest that this has ever been a Christians-only enterprise. Of course that isn't true. If anything, proportionally, atheists have shown more propensity to do great science. But it is undeniable that Christians have at a minimum played a huge role in creating modern science. And this isn't an accident -- it is because Christianity provides a great epistemology for empiricism.
So when you argue that my belief in "Jesus above all" (and to be clear -- that is unapologetically my belief) inhibits me from doing great science, I mostly point to the long history of science that says otherwise.
However, you raise some substantive points here that are certainly worth fleshing out more -- I may perhaps do so in another post. And I appreciate the spirit of fairness with which your intellectual points are raised!
Thanks for your reply, Luke. Here is further clarification.
Of course, we all have biases, and we all struggle with them, trying to be the best scientists we can be. But the problem becomes more serious when we study topics that are very close to our core identity. I have written about this previously in relation to my own field. For example, if someone openly states “I hate cars, and that motivated my entire scientific career in transport research,” then I cannot help but wonder what comes first for them—the pursuit of truth or their personal animosity (below is the quote from my article).
In your case, you did not say you “hate” anything, but you did express “Jesus above all.” Then you published a piece on Islamophobia, criticizing previous research and calling out progressive scholars. Honestly, this makes me uneasy. Especially because you did not even discuss that even the low prevalence estimates (up to 3% phobic and 7% fearful) you found in your work may carry meaningful social consequences, given the types of involuntary behavioral reactions that individuals with clinically significant fear may exhibit when encountering the object of their phobia.
As I mentioned earlier, I submitted my commentary on your article to the journal, but it was rejected by the editor using language I found derogatory.
Among other thing the editor resubmitted my manuscript without my consent. In my email after the editor requested revision, I explicitly indicated that I intended to submit a revised version only after receiving responses to my questions. This indicates that I had not authorized resubmission. Author approval is a fundamental requirement for submission actions, and this step was taken without such approval. In the absence of author approval, the manuscript should have been withdrawn rather than resubmitted and desk rejected.
So yes, I remain skeptical about what kind of scientific environment this represents—what is allowed, and what is not allowed, to be published in that journal. It feels as though long‑neglected conservative scholars (such as you?) may have finally found an outlet that gives them an unusually easy ride, while any criticism is dismissed with dubious argumentation and questionable editorial practices.
The quote from my article: “Nonfinancial conflict of interest in peer-review: Some notes for discussion” https://doi.org/10.1080/08989621.2021.1989677
“A well-known and respected active travel researcher said in a recent inter view “I have been a hater of cars from my entire life. And that was what I was actually motivated my entire academic career” (Bernstein, & Reid, 2021, 2:49). Although the negative impact of cars on the environment and health is well researched and documented, it can hardly be put in the same category as cancer for example. There is a broad scientific consensus that no benefits can be associated with cancer, thus, hating cancer seems appropriate, although such researchers should be conscious about their strong motivation and the negative effects it can have on their work (e.g., observer bias). The same can hardly be said about cars as a machine. Openly stating that hate toward cars preceded and motivated an entire academic career is a clear sign of a biased approach to the topic of one’s research. A legitimate question arises here: if you hate the topic of your research, be it a car or perhaps a bicycle helmet, how will you as an editor or reviewer deal with a paper that says anything positive about cars or helmets?”